Misunderstanding South East Asia: The Analytical Weaknesses of John Mearsheimer’s powerful theory
In the wake of the Novel Coronavirus global pandemic and the Trump administration’s continued incompetence John Mearsheimer’s eloquent post mortem of the liberal international order has unsurprisingly received renewed attention. After a convincing exposition of the recent geopolitical history of the world Mearsheimer draws on his own theoretical perspective offensive realism to describe where — in his view — international politics is heading. As a theory offensive realism has always has always had flaws of oversight. These problems are no more evident than in John Mearsheimer’s understanding of the strategic situation in South East Asia.
Mearsheimer’s key thesis is that China is in the process of building its own global order to challenge the US global order. As soon as we look beyond global politics to the particularities of china’s strategic situation the problems with this thesis emerge. China is bordered by three major states of great strategic relevance to itself, India Japan and Russia. In the case of India and Japan it has no chance of recruiting them into its order while Russia would make for an opportunistic partner at best.
These states all have a fundamentally strong security position with respect to China. This is due to their strongly independent culture and sense of nationalism, favourable geography and in the case of japan its economic wealth. There is no question of the Indian or Japanese political elites deferring to China. The strident nationalism and sense of cultural autonomy of their populations effectively prohibits that. India is protected by the Himalayas and has a comparable population to china. Japan is an island nation with a buffer state (Korea) between itself and China. Japan possess far superior defence technology and even if this advantage erodes its wealth ensures it will always have competitive weapons systems to control the air and sea around Japan.
There are many small states who will struggle to maintain their autonomy as Beijing grows more powerful. This is already apparent in situations such as the China — Philippines Spratly Island dispute. The smaller states of South East Asia and central Asia could plausibly be drawn into a Chinese lead order as Beijing grows more assertive. Although Beijing may find nations such as Vietnam and Thailand much more difficult to push around than it would like. The question is whether the ability to bully these marginal states really makes China more powerful globally and contributes to a change in the balance of power. Mearsheimer never spells out the detail of what would constitute the Chinese global order but this point seems doubtful.
Mearsheimer says because it’s neighbours will fear it, China would be crazy not to become as powerful as possible. In fact, the reverse is true. Russia, Japan, India and other Asian states are not predisposed to cooperate with one another. Indeed, Asia is characterised by bitter feelings among states that might otherwise be allies with mutual strategic interest such as the long running feud between South Korea and Japan. the more China displays an overt aim to dominate the more India and Japan in particular will resist. As a state with many neighbours and its own excruciating security dilemma the worst mistake China could make would be to isolate itself and unite its neighbours in shared enmity. Even very high Chinese military investment would not completely reduce the security of its neighbours. As such regardless of how powerful it is China will always have neighbours that can be a source of opposition in a crisis. Security through military strength alone is not an option for China — it requires a more nuanced solution to its severe security dilemma.
One of the problems with realist theories is that while based on the concept of state power it is always difficult to create a sound definition of what exactly power is. This is why Mearsheimer’s view of Russia a re-emerging great power is an interesting one. what is it that makes Russia a great power? Russia has a GDP substantially smaller than that of just one European state — Germany. If — as a range of political figures have suggested from Donald Trump to Bernie Sanders — The United States were to substantially withdraw from its base in Germany the European states would be fully capable of containing Russia themselves.
Russia does have its own well developed defence industry — a legacy of the former USSR, which gives it influence as an arms exporter. Russia also invests heavily in asymmetric capabilities which can allow it to disrupt a wealthier and more militarily strong power like the united states. But perhaps the greatest case for Russia as a great power would be its highly active foreign policy. Its power being derived from precarious foundations nether less under Vladimir Putin Russia behaves like a great power; showing a willingness to intervene across a wide sphere of influence beyond its direct interests. Syria and the Ukraine being some recent examples.
Iran is another state which intervenes widely in its own region. Through its Quds force and ideology Iran has an inexpensive means to project influence across its region. Does this activism mean we should consider Iran a great power? Or what about Saudi Arabia which has greatly influenced the affairs of other countries by spreading Wahhabism around the world and even forming links with the foreign policy making machine of the United States. These examples show that the foundational concept of offensive realism — power — is not as concrete as it needs to be.
Mearsheimer is correct to view global history as a series of different strategic regimes remarkably well bracketed into different historical periods. It’s this overall vision that substantially explains global politics which has bedazzled many observers. In his efforts to generalise the grandee of offensive realism obscures the key insight about these past eras; how profoundly different and idiosyncratic each of them was. In comparing the various different strategic regimes, we can identify the particular factors in each case pushing toward or away from conflict and instability. The 20th century has so far seen 3 periods of conflict in the world wars and the cold war, which adds weight to the pessimist’s view. Still on balance the present strategic situation is much mor likely to have a peaceful outcome than its 3 predecessors. Even more so if policy makers actively plan for peace or at least to minimise and contain conflict.
There are many small states who will struggle to maintain their autonomy as Beijing grows more powerful. This is already apparent in situations such as the China — Philippines Spratly Island dispute. The smaller states of South East Asia and central Asia could plausibly be drawn into a Chinese lead order as Beijing grows more assertive. Although Beijing may find nations such as Vietnam and Thailand much more difficult to push around than it would like. The question is whether the ability to bully these marginal states really makes China more powerful globally and contributes to a change in the balance of power. Mearsheimer never spells out the detail of what would constitute the Chinese global order but this point seems doubtful.
Mearsheimer says because it’s neighbours will fear it, China would be crazy not to become as powerful as possible. In fact, the reverse is true. Russia, Japan, India and other Asian states are not predisposed to cooperate with one another. Indeed, Asia is characterised by bitter feelings among states that might otherwise be allies with mutual strategic interest such as the long running feud between South Korea and Japan. the more China displays an overt aim to dominate the more India and Japan in particular will resist. As a state with many neighbours and its own excruciating security dilemma the worst mistake China could make would be to isolate itself and unite its neighbours in shared enmity. Even very high Chinese military investment would not completely reduce the security of its neighbours. As such regardless of how powerful it is China will always have neighbours that can be a source of opposition in a crisis. Security through military strength alone is not an option for China — it requires a more nuanced solution to its severe security dilemma.
One of the problems with realist theories is that while based on the concept of state power it is always difficult to create a sound definition of what exactly power is. This is why Mearsheimer’s view of Russia a re-emerging great power is an interesting one. what is it that makes Russia a great power? Russia has a GDP substantially smaller than that of just one European state — Germany. If — as a range of political figures have suggested from Donald Trump to Bernie Sanders — The United States were to substantially withdraw from its base in Germany the European states would be fully capable of containing Russia themselves.
Russia does have its own well developed defence industry — a legacy of the former USSR, which gives it influence as an arms exporter. Russia also invests heavily in asymmetric capabilities which can allow it to disrupt a wealthier and more militarily strong power like the united states. But perhaps the greatest case for Russia as a great power would be its highly active foreign policy. Its power being derived from precarious foundations nether less under Vladimir Putin Russia behaves like a great power; showing a willingness to intervene across a wide sphere of influence beyond its direct interests. Syria and the Ukraine being some recent examples.
Iran is another state which intervenes widely in its own region. Through its Quds force and ideology Iran has an inexpensive means to project influence across its region. Does this activism mean we should consider Iran a great power? Or what about Saudi Arabia which has greatly influenced the affairs of other countries by spreading Wahhabism around the world and even forming links with the foreign policy making machine of the United States. These examples show that the foundational concept of offensive realism — power — is not as concrete as it needs to be.
Mearsheimer is correct to view global history as a series of different strategic regimes remarkably well bracketed into different historical periods. It’s this overall vision that substantially explains global politics which has bedazzled many observers. In his efforts to generalise the grandee of offensive realism obscures the key insight about these past eras; how profoundly different and idiosyncratic each of them was. In comparing the various different strategic regimes, we can identify the particular factors in each case pushing toward or away from conflict and instability. The 20th century has so far seen 3 periods of conflict in the world wars and the cold war, which adds weight to the pessimist’s view. Still on balance the present strategic situation is much mor likely to have a peaceful outcome than its 3 predecessors. Even more so if policy makers actively plan for peace or at least to minimise and contain conflict.
Like Germany in 1900 we know that China is a rising power surrounded by potentially hostile rival powers and therefore uncertain about its security. Unlike Wilhelmine Germany China seems unlikely to take the risky option of fighting its way to security. Wilhelmine Germany had a history of fighting wars of choice on hostile territory. The German military doctrine of mobilising quickly to achieve tactical supremacy had deep routes in German history going back to the time of Frederick the great. Recent history suggested that wars could be brief decisive and limited. just as in 1870 Paris was tantalisingly close to the German border. Policy making authority was split between the monarchy military and civilian leadership. The incompetent Kaiser having inherited his thrown by birth was a destabilising influence.
Xi Jinping may be determined to strengthen China by force if necessary but he is much more akin to the shrewd Bismarck than the bumbling Kaiser Wilhelm. Tokyo and Delhi are a long way from the Chinese border. History and Elite assumptions both indicate that a land war in Asia would be a punishing affair that would destroy all of its participants. All this suggests we can avoid a modern repeat of the events of 1914 or 1870. An arms race and rival triple entente vs central powers style systems of alliances can be avoided. China will experience political turbulence as Xi ages. The condition for peace at that time will be a minimum of the tensions the international system may be creating in the present.
These opportunities for peace can only be taken if China and the United States start consciously planning to limit military competition now. This should be possible. After all it is in the self interest of both parties. Not for the first time the pessimism of John Mearsheimer is unfounded.
Thank you for reading in the second part of this response to John Mearsheimer we will analyse the strategic history of the 20th century in more detail. Please tell me if you agree or disagree and why in the comments section!